Disclosure of Key Audit Matters, CEO Duality and Corporate Earnings Management: Construction of a Dynamic Integration Framework from Balance Failure and Signaling to Dynamic Substitution

Authors

  • Zonghao Li Marketing Major, School of Economics and Management, Heilongjiang University of Technology, Jixi City, Heilongjiang Province, 158100, China

Keywords:

Key Audit Matters, CEO Duality, Earnings Management, Dynamic Substitution Effect, Signaling

Abstract

Whether Key Audit Matter (KAM) disclosure can actually restrain earnings management in firms with CEO duality sits at the crossroads of audit quality and corporate governance research. Most existing studies take one of two paths – balance failure or signaling – yet their assumptions and findings rarely connect. After reviewing the relevant literature, this paper argues that KAM ‘s effect on earnings management is not a fixed “restraining or inducing” outcome. Instead, it appears to unfold as a dynamic process, shaped by shifts in audit pressure and by how managers choose to respond. Building on this idea, the paper sets out a “dynamic substitution effect of audit supervision” framework, which links KAM signaling, the switch toward real earnings management, and the gradual restoration of internal governance into three sequential stages. The framework may help reconcile some conflicting results in the literature, and it offers a set of testable propositions for future work.

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Published

2026-11-21

How to Cite

Disclosure of Key Audit Matters, CEO Duality and Corporate Earnings Management: Construction of a Dynamic Integration Framework from Balance Failure and Signaling to Dynamic Substitution. (2026). CPS Digital Library - Series of Conferences, 110-114. https://seriesofconference.com/index.php/SCJ/article/view/573